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AbstractDifferent models can be used to describe real-life

To validate such models, we must therefore compare the

phenomena: deterministic, probabilistic, fuzzy, models in which

predicted probability distribution with the empirical probabil-

we have interval-valued or fuzzy-valued probabilities, etc. Models
are usually not absolutely accurate. It is therefore important
to know how accurate is a given model. In other words, it is

ity distribution. In such situations, it is not completely clear
how we can measure the mismatch between the corresponding

important to be able to measure a mismatch between the model

probability distributions, i.e., how we can gauge the validity

and the empirical data. In this paper, we describe an approach of

of the probabilistic models.

measuring this mismatch which is based on the notion of utility,
the central notion of utility theory.
We also show that a similar approach can be used to measure
the loss of privacy.

I. F ORMULATION OF THE P ROBLEM
A. Models are usually approximate
In most areas of science and engineering, we only have

E. Additional complexity and relation to fuzzy techniques
In practice, the situation is even more complex. Based
on a nite sample of real-life events, we cannot uniquely
determine the corresponding empirical distribution: we can
only provide, with different degrees of condence, bounds on
the corresponding probabilities.

approximate models for the real-world phenomena, i.e., mod-

In other words, for each event, instead of a single value

els which are not 100% accurate. Since the models are

of its probability, we get a nested family of condence inter-

approximate, their predictions are also only approximate.

vals corresponding to different levels of uncertainty. Nested
families are, in effect, equivalent to fuzzy numbers; see, e.g.,

B. It is desirable to gauge the accuracy of a model
In order to understand how accurate are the models' pre-

[2], [7], [8], [9], so hopefully, techniques for processing fuzzy
numbers will be helpful in this comparison.

dictions, we need to know how accurate are the models
themselves.
An ideal way to gauge the quality of a model is to compare
it with the empirical data, i.e., to validate this model.
C. Simplest case: deterministic phenomena
Let us start with the simplest situation, when we have a
deterministic phenomenon and we have a deterministic model
which describes this phenomenon. In this situation, we can
simply compare the measured value of the desired quantity
with the values predicted by the model.

F. What we do in this paper
In this paper, we mainly consider the case of probability
distributions. The last section discusses the possibility of
extending these results to a more general case of intervalvalued probability distributions (p-boxes) and nested (= fuzzy)
families of such interval-valued objects.
We also show that a similar approach can be used to measure
the degree of privacy loss.
Comment. Some of our privacy-related results appeared in [1].

In such a situation, the difference between the actual and
II. O UR M AIN I DEA : U TILITY A PPROACH

predicted values is a reasonable measure of a mismatch
between the real-life phenomenon and the model.
D. Real-life situation: non-deterministic phenomena
In real life, many phenomena are non-deterministic. For

A. Utility approach: a reminder
In decision making theory, it is proven that under certain
reasonable assumptions, a person's preferences are dened by

such phenomena, we cannot predict the exact values of the

his or her utility function

corresponding quantities; at best, we can predict the probabil-

outcome

ities of different values of these quantities.

[10].

x

U (x) which assigns to each possible
U (x) called utility; see, e.g., [6],

a real number

In many real-life situations, a person's choice

s

does

not determine the outcome uniquely, we may have different outcomes

x1 , . . . , xn

with probabilities, correspondingly,

p1 , . . . , pn . For such a choice, we can describe the utility U (s)
associated with this choice as the expected value of the utility
of outcomes:

should we consider

In different situations, we may have different utility functions

U (x)

that describe the dependence of a (predicted)

gain on the (unknown) actual value of the corresponding
parameter

U (x)

Among several possible choices, a user selects the one for
which the utility is the largest: a possible choice
to a possible choice

s

0

(denoted

0

s>s)

s is preferred

if and only if

x.

for each situation with a reasonable accuracy, e.g., with

an accuracy

U (s) > U (s ).
In the general case, when we have a (1-dimensional) probability distribution with the cumulative distribution function
the utility is described by a similar formula

x

are not exception. Let us denote by

x,

δ

i.e., the upper bound

def

∆x = x
e −x between
the measured value x
e and the (unknown) actual value x. Due
to this difference, the estimated value U (e
x) is different from
the ideal prediction U (x). Usually, measurement errors ∆x
are small, so we can expand the prediction inaccuracy

def

∆U = U (e
x) − U (x) = U (x + ∆x) − U (x)

U (x) dF (x).

In particular, in the continuous case, when we have a
probability distribution with the probability density (pdf)

ρ(x),

the utility is described by a formula

Z

U (s) = E[U (x)] =

Measurements are never 100% accurate,

the accuracy with which we measure

Z

U (s) = E[U (x)] =

ε > 0.

and measurement of

on the (absolute value of) the difference

0

F (x),

U (x)

This prediction only makes sense only if we can predict

U (s) = E[U (x)] = p1 · U (x1 ) + . . . + pn · U (xn ).

(cdf)

C. Which functions

U (x) · ρ(x) dx.

B. Application of utility approach to the problem of measuring
a mismatch between probability distributions

in Taylor series in

∆x

and ignore quadratic and higher order

∆U ≈ U 0 (x) · ∆x, where
U (x) denotes the derivative of the utility function U (x).
Since the largest possible value of ∆x is δ , the largest
0
possible value for ∆U is thus |U (x)| · δ . Since this value
0
should not exceed ε, we thus conclude that |U (x)| · δ ≤ ε,
def
0
i.e., that |U (x)| ≤ M = ε/δ .
terms in this expansion, leading to

0

Thus, we arrive at the following denition.

Since our preferences are characterized by the utility values,
it is reasonable to measure mismatch by the possible decrease
in utility. Specically, let
and

F2 (x)

F1 (x)

denote the (usually unknown) cdf of the actual

distribution. Similarly, in the continuous case, we will denote
the pdf corresponding to the model by
pdf by

III. D EFINITION AND THE M AIN R ESULT

denote the cdf of the model,

ρ1 (x)

and the actual

ρ2 (x).

F2 (x) be two probability distriM > 0 be a real number. By
the degree of mismatch dM (F1 , F2 ) between the distributions,
Denition 1. Let

and

we mean the largest possible value of the difference

Z

In these terms, if we make a decision based on the model
distribution

F1 (x)

butions on a real line, and let

F1 (x),

then the expect value of utility is

Z

U1 =

U (x) dF1 (x).

over all possible functions

Since the actual distribution is different, the actual value of
the expected utility is equal to

all

U (x) dF2 (x)

U (x)

for which

|U 0 (x)| ≤ M

for

x.

Proposition 1. For every two distributions,

Z

U2 =

Z
U (x) dF1 (x) −

Z

U (x) dF2 (x).

dM (F1 , F2 ) = M ·

|F1 (x) − F2 (x)| dx.

If the actual expected utility is smaller than the what we
planned, i.e., if

U2 < U1 ,

then we have a loss caused by

the mismatch. It is therefore reasonable to characterize the
mismatch by this loss

U1 − U2 .

This loss describes the effect of the mismatch on a specic
problem characterized by a specic utility function

U (x).

Usually, a model is used for many different applications, with
many different utility functions. In some applications, the

Comment. In view of this result, it is reasonable to measure
the mismatch between two probability distributions by the
following

L1 -metric:
def

d(F1 , F2 ) =

Z
|F1 (x) − F2 (x)| dx.

difference between the two probability distribution may be
irrelevant for our objectives; in this case, there is no loss. In

This metric was indeed proposed and successfully used in

other situations, this different may lead to a signicant loss.

model validation [4], [5]. The above result shows that this

It is reasonable to gauge the mismatch by the worst possible
loss caused by this mismatch.

metric is not only reasonable, it follows from the general
decision theory-motivated utility-based approach.

IV. P ROOF OF THE M AIN R ESULT
The desired difference

V. H OW TO E XTEND THE M EASURE OF M ISMATCH TO
P -B OXES AND TO

∆U = U1 − U2

can be reformulated

as the integral

A. Extension to p-boxes
In practice, based on the empirical data, we cannot uniquely

Z
∆U =

U (x) (dF1 (x) − dF2 (x)).

Integrating this expression by parts, we conclude that

Z

F (x).
[F (x), F (x)] that

determine the corresponding probabilities

Instead, we

can have condence intervals

contain the

(unknown) values of these probabilities; see, e.g., [11], [12].
Such an interval-valued function that assigns, to every real
number

(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) · U 0 (x) dx.

∆U =

F UZZY-VALUED P -B OXES

x,

the corresponding interval

[F (x), F (x)]

is called a

p-box; see, e.g., [3]. Once we x the condence level, we thus
have a p-box that contains all probability distributions which

Since

|U 0 (x)| ≤ M ,

are consistent with the given empirical data.

we conclude that

In this situation, when the empirical data is describe by a

0

0

(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) · U (x) ≤ |(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) · U (x)| =

p-box, how can we describe to what extent a given probability

F (x)
F (x) ∈ [F (x), F (x)]

model is consistent with the empirical data? If the model

|F1 (x) − F2 (x)| · |U 0 (x)| ≤ M · |F1 (x) − F2 (x)|

ts within the p-box
for all

x,

F (F ∈ F),

i.e., if

this means that we have a perfect match.

In general, it is reasonable to dene the degree of mismatch

and thus,

as the smallest possible mismatch between a model

Z
(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) · U 0 (x) dx ≤

∆U =

F1

and

distributions from a given p-box:

d(F1 , F) = min d(F1 , F2 ).
Z

F2 ∈F

Z
M · |F1 (x) − F2 (x)| dx = M ·

So, we have

∆U ≤ dM (F1 , F2 )

|F1 (x) − F2 (x)| dx.
for all possible utility

U (x). Thus, the largest possible value of ∆U cannot
exceed dM (F1 , F2 ).
Let us now show that the largest possible value of ∆U is actually equal to dM (F1 , F2 ), i.e., the value ∆U = dM (F1 , F2 )
is attained for some utility function U (x). Indeed, as such a
functions

utility function, we can take

def

Z

• when

M · sign(F1 (t) − F2 (t)) dt,

• when
• when

between

−0.1

and

0.1.

In this case, a model is also naturally

described by a p-box. In such situations, it is reasonable to
dene the mismatch between the p-box
model and the p-box

F2

we dene
we dene
we dene

F1

describing the

describing the empirical distribution

as the smallest possible mismatch between the probability
distributions

F 1 ∈ F1

F2 ∈ F2 :

and

min

F1 ∈F1 ,F2 ∈F2

d(F1 , F2 ).

B. Case of fuzzy uncertainty
Instead of xing a single condence level, it is reasonable

is dened as usual:

u > 0,
u < 0,
u = 0,

our model, we have a normal distribution with the mean

d(F1 , F2 ) =

−∞

sign(u)

abilistic terms. For example, we can say that according to

x

U (x) =
where

A model itself is not necessarily formulated in precise prob-

to consider condence intervals

sign(u) = +1;
sign(u) = −1;
sign(u) = 0.

different condence levels

α.

F(α) (x)

corresponding to

The resulting nested family of

intervals can be naturally viewed as a fuzzy number for which
these intervals are

U 0 (x) = M · sign(F1 (x) − F2 (x))
0
|U (x)| ≤ M for all x. On the other hand, for this

α-cuts; see, e.g.,
F (x) may

[2], [7], [8], [9]. Alterna-

For this utility function,

tively, the probabilities

and thus,

thus, can be naturally represented as fuzzy numbers. In both

be given by experts and

case, it is reasonable to characterize the mismatch between the

function,

corresponding fuzzy-valued probability distributions

Z
0

∆U =

(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) · U (x) dx =

Z

F2

as a function that assigns, to every level

mismatch between the corresponding

d
(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) · M · sign(F1 (x) − F2 (x)) dx.

(α)

(F1 , F2 ) =

min

(α)

F1 ∈F1

α,

F1

and

the degree of

α-cuts:
(α)

d(F1 , F2 ).

,F2 ∈F2

VI. H OW TO M EASURE L OSS OF P RIVACY: A N AUXILIARY
For each value

u,

we have

u · sign(u) = |u|.

Thus,

Z
∆U =

P ROBLEM
A. Measuring loss of privacy is important

M · |F1 (x) − F2 (x)| dx,

Privacy means, in particular, that we do not disclose all
the information about ourselves. If some of the originally un-

i.e., indeed,

∆U = dM (F1 , F2 ).

The proposition is proven.

disclosed information is disclosed, some privacy is lost. To

compare different privacy protection schemes, we must be able

Thus, the insurance company will insure the person for a

to gauge the resulting loss of privacy.

cost of

Z
E[F (x)] =

B. Seemingly natural idea: measuring loss of privacy by the

ρ(x) · F (x) dx.

acquired amount of information
Since privacy means that we do not have complete information about a person, a seemingly natural idea is to gauge
the loss of privacy by the amount of new information that we
gained about this person.

Let us now assume that for some individual, the privacy
is lost, and for this individual, we know the exact value
can now better predict its medical expenses as
offer a new rate

F (x0 ) = f (x0 ) · (1 + α).

C. Why information is not always a perfect measure of loss

f (x0 ) and thus,

When

F (x0 ) > E[F (x)],

of privacy
In our opinion, the amount of new information is not always

x0

of his or her blood pressure. For this individual, the company

the person whose privacy is lost also experiences a nancial

a good measure of the loss of privacy because it does not

loss

distinguish between:

the loss of privacy.

F (x0 )−E[F (x)]. We will use this nancial loss to gauge

• crucial information that may seriously affect a person,
E. Need for a worst-case comparison

and

• irrelevant information  that may not affect a person at
all.

In the above example, there is a nancial loss only if the
person's blood pressure

x0

is worse than average. A person

To make a distinction between these two types of information,

whose blood pressure is lower than average will only benet

let us estimate potential nancial losses caused by the loss of

from reduced insurance rates.

privacy.

However, in a somewhat different situation, if the person's

D. Example when loss of privacy can lead to a nancial loss
As an example, let us consider how a person's blood
pressure

x

affects the premium that this person pays for his

or her health insurance.
From the previous experience, insurance companies can
deduce, for each value of blood pressure
(average) value of the medical expenses

x,

the expected

f (x) of all individuals

with this particular value of blood pressure. So, when the
insurance company knows the exact value

x

of a person's

blood pressure, it can offer this person an insurance rate

def

F (x) = f (x) · (1 + α),

where

α

is the general investment

prot. Indeed:

blood pressure is smaller (better) than average, this person's
loss or privacy can also lead to a nancial loss. For example,
an insurance company may, in general, pay for a preventive
medication that lowers the risk of heart attacks  and of
the resulting huge medical expenses. The higher the blood
pressure, the larger the risk of a heart attack. So, if the
insurance company learns that a certain individual has a lowerthan-average blood pressure and thus, a lower-than-average
risk of a heart attack, this risk may not justify the expenses
on the preventive medication. Thus, due to a privacy loss, the
individual will have to pay for this potentially benecial medication from his/her own pocket  and thus, also experience a
nancial loss.

• If an insurance company offers higher rates, then its

So, to gauge a privacy loss, we must consider not just a

competitor will be able to offer lower rates and still make

single situation, but several different situations, and gauge the

a prot.

loss of privacy by the worst-case nancial loss caused by this

• On the other hand, if the insurance company is selling

loss of privacy.

insurance at a lower rate, then it will not earn enough
prot, and investors will pull their money out and invest
somewhere else.

F. Which functions

F (x)

should we consider

Similarly to the main part of the text, we should consider

To preserve privacy, we only keep the information that
the blood pressure of all individuals from a certain group
is between two bounds

L

and

U,

functions

F (x) for which |F 0 (x)| ≤ M

and we do not know

have any additional information about the blood pressure of
different individuals. Under this information, how much will
the insurance company charge to insure people from this

G. Resulting denitions
Thus, we arrive at the following denition:
Denition 2. Let

group?
Based on the past experience, the insurance company is able
to deduce the relative frequency of different values

x ∈ [L, U ]

 e.g., in the form of the corresponding probability density

of privacy

A(P)

• all possible
• all possible

Z

ρ(x) · f (x) dx.

be a class of probability distributions on

M >0

• all possible
all

x.

be a real number. By the amount

P , we
R mean the largest possible
F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx over:
values x0 ,
probability distributions ρ ∈ P , and
0
functions F (x) for which |F (x)| ≤ M for
related to

value of the difference

person from this group are equal to

def

P

a real line, and let

ρ(x). In this case, the expected medical expenses of an average
E[f (x)] =

for some given number

M > 0.

The above denition involves taking a maximum over all
distributions

ρ∈P

which are consistent with the known infor-

mation about the group to which a given individual belongs. In
some cases, we know the exact probability distribution, so the
family

P

consists of only one distribution. In other situations,

we may not know this distribution. For example, we may only
know that the value of

x

is within the interval

[L, U ],

and we

do not know the probabilities of different values within this
interval. In this case, the class

P

consists of all distributions

which are located on this interval (with probability 1).

and

M0

M : A(P) = M · A0 (P).
A(P) (and a similar expression

also differ by a factor

Substituting this expression for

A(Q)) into the denition (1), we can therefore conclude
A0 (P) − A0 (Q)
A(P) − A(Q)
=
, i.e., that the measure
that
A(P)
A0 (P)
of privacy is indeed the same for M and M0 = 1. The
for

proposition is proven.
H. The new denition of privacy loss is in good agreement
with intuition

When we learn new information about this individual, we

Let us show that the new denition adequately describes the

thus reduce the group and hence, change from the original

difference between learning that the parameter is in the lower

class

P

to a new class

Q.

This change, in general, decreases

the amount of privacy.
In particular, when we learn the exact value

x0

of the

parameter, then the resulting class of distribution reduces to

x0 with probability
ρ(x) · F (x) dx = 0 and thus, the

a single distribution concentrated on this
1  for which

F (x0 ) −

R

privacy is 0. In this case, we have a 100% loss of privacy 
from the original value

A(P)

to 0. In other cases, we may

have a partial loss of privacy.
In general, it is reasonable to dene the relative loss of
privacy as a ratio

A(P) − A(Q)
.
A(P)

(1)

In other words, it is reasonable to use the following denition:

Denition 3.

• By a privacy loss, we mean a pair

hP, Qi

of classes of

probability distributions.

• For each privacy loss

hP, Qi, by the measure of a privacy

loss, we mean the ratio (1).

half of the original interval and that the parameter if even.
Proposition 3. Let

[L, U ],

and let

privacy loss is the same for all

hP, Qi,
M > 0.

the measure of the

Proof. To prove this proposition, it is sufcient to show that

M > 0, the measure of privacy loss is the same
M and for M0 = 1. Indeed, for each function F (x)
0
for which |F (x)| ≤ M for all x, for the re-scaled function
def
F0 (x) = F (x)/M , we have |F00 (x)| ≤ 1 for all x, and
Z
F (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F (x) dx =

for each
for this

µ
¶
Z
M · F0 (x0 ) − ρ(x) · F0 (x) dx .

(2)

0
Vice versa, if |F0 (x)| ≤ 1 for all x, for the re-scaled function
def
F (x) = M · F0 (x), we have |F 0 (x)| ≤ M for all x,
and (2). Thus, the maximized values corresponding to
and

M0 = 1

M.
A0 (P)

different by a factor

amounts of privacy

A(P)

and

M

Hence, the resulting
corresponding to

M

be the

be the class of all probability distributions

[l, u]. For this pair hP, Qi, the measure
u−l
equal to 1 −
.
U −L

M = 1. Let
A(P) = U − L.
Let us rst show that for every x0 ∈ [L, U ], for every
probability distribution ρ(x) on the interval [L, U ], and for
0
every function F (x) for which |F (x)| ≤ 1, the privacy loss
R
F (x0 ) − ρ(x) ·RF (x) dx does not exceed U − L.
Indeed, since
ρ(x) dx = 1, we have
Z
F (x0 ) = ρ(x) · F (x0 ) dx
the privacy loss, it is sufcient consider the case

us show that for this

and hence,

Since

M,

we have

Z

Z
ρ(x) · F (x) dx =

|F 0 (x)| ≤ 1,

ρ(x) (F (x0 ) − F (x)) dx.

we conclude that

|F (x0 ) − F (x)| ≤ |x0 − x|.

M:

Proposition 2. For each pair

P

Proof. Due to Proposition 2, for computing the measure of

it is easy to see that the actual measure of the privacy loss
does not depend on

Q

of the privacy loss if

Comment. At rst glance, it may sound as if these denitions

M . However,

be intervals, let

located on the interval

F (x0 ) −

depend on an (unknown) value of the parameter

[l, u] ⊆ [L, U ]

class of all probability distributions located on the interval

Both x0
U − LR,

x are within the interval [L, U ], hence |x0 − x| ≤
|F (x0 ) − F (x)| ≤ U − L. Thus, the average
value
ρ(x)·(F (x0 )−F (x)) dx of this difference also cannot
exceed U − L.
Let us now show that there exists a value x0 ∈ [L, U ],
a probability distribution ρ(x) on the interval [L, U ], and a
0
function F (x) for which |F (x)| ≤ 1, for which the privacy
R
loss F (x0 ) −
ρ(x) · F (x) dx is exactly U − L. As such an
example, we take F (x) = x, x0 = U , and ρ(x) located at a
point x = L with probability 1. In this case, the privacy loss
is equal to F (U ) − F (L) = U − L.
Similarly, we can prove that A(Q) = u − l, so we get the
and

and

desired measure of the privacy loss. The proposition is proven.

Comment. In particular, if we start with an interval
and then we learn that the actual value

[L, (L + U )/2]
loss.

x

[L, U ],

is in the lower half

of this interval, then we get a 50% privacy

What about the case when we assume that

x

is even?

Similarly to the proof of the above proposition, one can prove
that if both
distributions
even values

L and U are even, and Q is the class of all
ρ(x) which are located, with probability 1, on
x, we get A(Q) = A(P). Thus, the even-values

restriction lead to a 0% privacy loss.
Thus, the new denition of the privacy loss is indeed in
good agreement with our intuition.
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and D. Berleant, Two Etudes on Combining Probabilistic and Interval
Uncertainty: Processing Correlations and Measuring Loss of Privacy,
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Intelligent Technologies InTech'06, Taipei, Taiwan, December 1315, 2006, pp. 817.

Press, Boca Raton, Florida, 2006.
[10] H. Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts,
1970.
[11] D. J. Sheskin, Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical
Procedures, Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, Florida, 2004.
[12] H. M. Wadswort, (ed.), Handbook of statistical methods for engineers
and scientists, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., New York, 1990.

